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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MICHIO TOMINO,
PlaintiffRespondent,
v.

Case No.

14835

GREATER PARK CITY
COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
DefendantAppellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, assignee of Development Services,
Incorporated (hereinafter "Development Services" or hereinafter referred to as "Purchaser"), brought this action
under a contract to recover certain funds previously paid
to Defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
During the course of the proceeding partial summary judgments were granted on certain issues and a nonjury trial was conducted on September 8, 1976 before the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. resulting in

a Memorandum

Decision (R. 198-99), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (R. 202-07), and a Judgment (R. 208) in
· f avor of Plain·
tiff and against Defendant with judgment in the sum of
$103,975.00 together with accrued interest. F/N

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant states that it seeks reversal of the
judgment and a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The operative facts relative to the transaction
in question are not particularly in dispute.

The parties

stipulated (see R. 233 through 238) with respect to most
of the operative facts and the admission of most of the
operative documents.

The pertinent facts, which are

herein set forth in essentially the same order as they are
found in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.
202, et seg.) are as follows:
On the 7th day of February, 1974, Development
Services, Inc., a Nebraska corporation (hereinafter called

F /N In its discussion of "Disposition in Lower court" at .
p. 2 of its Brief, Defendant claims that its presentati
of evidence at trial "was limited by the prior sununarv
judgments". To the contrary, De~endant,. for re~so~~f'.
unclear, offered evidence on subJects which Plaint7 t''
were precluded by the prior summary judgments, plain··
objected accordingly, but the trial court allowed the
evidence in.
(R. 244).
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"Development"), and defendant executed a Purchase Agreement
regarding certain real propery located in Park City, Utah.
(See Exhibit 1-P, and R. 234) .F/N

The contract provided

in paragraph 26 as follows:
"It is the intention of the parties
that the Inn and all other facilities
constructed by Purchaser upon the
Subject Property will be operated
pursuant to a franchise granted by
Sheraton Inns, Inc., which shall
identify the same as a Sheraton Inn
or by a similar name and shall provide
for reservation, supervisory and other
services customary with Sheraton Inns,
Inc. franchisees. Purchaser agrees
that it will not commence construction
upon the Subject Property unless and
until such franchise or a comparable
franchise is obtained and a copy of
the franchise agreement is delivered
to GPCC. The provisions of this
Paragraph 26 shall not in any manner
constitute a basis for delay by Purchaser in making any payments or taking
any action on or before the dates herein
provided. In the event that such franchise or a comparable franchise is not
obtained prior to June 1, 1974, Purchaser
shall have the right, upon written notice
to GPCC given not later than June 15,
1974, to reconvey the Subject Property to
GPCC, in which event GPCC shall be obligated, promptly following such termination,
to refund to Purchaser all sums theretofore paid by Purchaser to GPCC as purchase
price for the Subject Property pursuant
to Paragraph 2 hereof, less a sum equal
to interest on said purchase price from
the date hereof to the date of such termination at the prime commercial rate established by Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
from time to time during such period."

F/N An amendment to the agreement was received as Exhibit
2-P together with a stipulation that it amended only
the property description.
(R. 237).
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Prior to February 7, 1974, Development paid
$5,000 to defendant as earnest money in
· connection
·
with
said agreement.

On February 7, 1974, Development paid

$25,000 to defendant.

The amount of $75, 000 was paid by

Development and accepted by defendant on March 7, 1974.
(See stipulation at R. 234).
Although the contract contemplated an original
closing date of April 30, 1974, the parties negotiated
concerning and agreed to an extension of time in which
to close said contract until approximately mid-July, 1974. r

An additional sum of $20,000 was paid by Development to
defendant on or about May 17, 1974 as consideration for
the agreement of extension.

Although no formal writing

was prepared between the parties to evidence this extension,
there were writings between the parties, signed by both
parties to be charged which, taken together, reflect the
extension agreement and the terms thereof.
4-P, R.

(See Exhibit

269-272).

F /N Defendant confesses ignorance as to the trial court's
findings that the extension was until "approximately
mid-July".
(See F/N on p. 6 of Appellant's Brief~._
This finding is based upon Exhibit 4-P which spec1fl·
cally mentions July on both the second an~ third pages
and on the testimony of defendant's own witi:e~s, Mr.
warren King who, being questioned about Exhibit 4-P,
testified:
"Obviously I saw this letter. I accepted
the $20,000. He says, 'I feel by July
we should have most of our financing
taken care of.' The letter says, 'Alright,
you can have until July to get it done.'"
(R. 27).
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As of June l, 1974, although Development had
submitted substantial materials to Sheraton Inns.in order
to facilitate a franchise being issued (R. 245, et seq.,
Exhibit 10-D), Development had not received a Sheraton
Inn franchise.

(Stipulation at R. 235).

on June 13,

1974 at 5:00 P.M., Development mailed to defendant a
notice terminating the agreement pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 26 thereof.

(Exhibit 5-P and R. 235).

Said notice was timely under the contract and was received
by defendant.

(R. 235).

On or about March 5, 1975, Development assigned
its rights in and to said Purchase Agreement to plaintiff,
notice of which assignment was duly given to defendant on
or about March 17, 1975.

(R. 236, Exhibit 6-P).

No Notice of Default was sent by defendant to
Development until approximately February 15, 1975, when a
Notice of Default was sent by defendant to Development and
which was received by Development.

On or about March 26,

1975, defendant sent and Development received a further
letter indicating that the default specified in the February
15th letter had not been cured.

(See Exhibit 8-P and 9-P

and stipulation at R. 236).
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PROCEDURAL HANDLING OF THE MATTER BELOW
Defendant complains ubiquitously in its Brief
about the "piecemeal" handling of this case below and
about the alleged failure of the courts below to accord
i t a proper opportunity to present facts and to enter
upon discovery.

In view of these statements, we deem it

germane to spend more than the ordinary amount of time
discussing the procedure below in its exact chronology:
The Complaint was filed on April 3, 1975.
2) .

(R.

An Appearance of Counsel and Acceptance of Service

was duly filed by Mr. M. Scott Woodland on behalf of Van
Cott, Bagley, Cornwall

&

McCarthy ( R. 8 and 9) and in due

course an Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint
was filed by Van Cott on behalf of Greater Park City
Company under date of May 8, 1975.

(R. 10,

et~.).

It

will be noted (see R. 12) that the only affirmative defensi
raised by Defendant was that Development had failed to act
in good faith in obtaining the Sheraton Franchise and
therefore was estopped from seeking refund of the payments
they had made under the agreement.

It will be further

noted that copies of the contract were attached to the
Answer of Defendant (R. 17, et seq.).
The next procedural step was that Plaintiff file

0

a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Partial SUJlllll:
Judgment under date of June 9, 1975.

(R.

47-48).
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•

Although the Motion for Summary Judgment or
Judgment on the Pleadings was originally noticed for
June 12, 1975 (R. 49), it was continued several times
until it was finally heard on October 9, 1975.
R. 64, R. 77).

(R. 50,

Plaintiff filed a memorandum in support

of its motion (R. 51-60), and prior to the hearing date
a Memorandum was filed on behalf of the Defendant by
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy.

(R. 65).

Although

no detailed evaluation of that Memorandum will be made at
this juncture, reference will be made to it throughout
the argument portion of this Brief to point out that a
number of the arguments being raised on this appeal relative
to that Motion for Summary Judgment were not raised below
by Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy.

When the matter

was finally heard on October 9, 1975, by Minute Entry
(R. 78) and Order (R. 79-80), Judge Bryant H. Croft granted
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Promptly, there was a substitution of counsel on
behalf of Defendant with van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall &
McCarthy withdrawing and Frederick S. Prince of Prince,
Yeates, ward & Geldzahler appearing.
October 28, 1975 - R. 81).

(This occurred on

On the same date, new counsel

for Defendant filed a Petition for Intermediate Appeal with
this Court.

(See generally this Court's Docket No. 14319

which contains the Interlocutory Appeal and matters pertaining thereto).

Significantly, in the Petition for

Intermediate Appeal filed by new counsel, they assert:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The lower court's order involved
defendant's substantial rights
under the contract and will
materially affect the final decision in that the defense struck
down by such order is the sole
affirmative defense asserted by
defendant and is determinitive of
the question of liability of
defendant to plaintiff, leaving
only the amount of damages to be
resolved by the court below."
This Court denied the Petition for Interlocu~ry
Appeal and, taking comfort in the admission by Defendant
that the sole substantive issue in the case had been resolved, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sununary Judgment.
(R. 82-83).

Plaintiff cited in that motion, as previously

conceded by Defendant, that the sole remaining issue was
the amount of damages which was capable of mathematical
resolution and Plaintiff submitted affidavits to support
the necessary mathematical computations.

(R. 84 through

86) .
An Order was appropriately issued finding the

amount of damages but, pursuant to the request of Defendant
authorizing Defendant to raise additional issues in the
proceeding by way of amendment to be made within ten (10)
days of the Order.

(See Order of Stewart M. Hanson, Sr.

at R. 111-112).
Taking full advantage of this authorization,
Defendant filed its Amended Answer under date of December
8, 1975 setting forth numerous affirmative defenses never
instances
·
raised before by previous counsel an d , in some
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(see particularly the Thl. rd Affi' rmative Defense at R. llSI

raising issues which were quite arguably precluded by
~.,the

the previous summary judgment Franchise matter.

Sheraton

Under its Amended Answer however, De-

fendant claimed that Plaintiff had in fact obtained a
Sheraton Franchise and therefore that the provisions of
paragraph 26 of the contract did not apply.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
that issue seeking to strike the Third Affirmative Defense
and filed therewith supporting affidavits indicating that
at no time did Development Services obtain a Sheraton
Franchise.

(See R. 122-124).

Although this was originally

noticed for May 21, 1976 (R. 125) it was continued from
time to time until June 30, 1976 (see R. 129 through 135)
for various reasons including "to allow defendant to file
counter affidavits".

(R. 133).

Defendant did not file any

counter affidavits and accordingly the motion was granted
when heard on June 30, 1976.

(See R. 135 and R. 150).

Even though the Sheraton Franchise issue had
therefore at that point been the subject of two definitive
summary judgments - one by Judge Croft and the final by
Judge Sawaya, and even though there was no remaining issue
in the pleadings dealing with that issue, Defendant filed
a notice to take the deposition of two employees of Sheraton
Inns, Inc. - Irving Zeldman and James Wellbeloved.

(R. 144).

Since the issues had been completely resolved by summary
judgment, Plaintiff, properly we submit, filed a Motion for
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Protective Order seeking to terminate these scheduled
depositions.

(R. 136-137).

The protective order matter

was heard by Marcellus K. Snow who, after argument,
entered his Order under date of July 14, 1976 to the
effect that:
"The plaintiff's Motion for
Protective Order should be and
the same hereby is granted, it
being the opinion of the court
that the Sheraton Inn Franchise
issue is no longer a relevant
issue in this proceeding in view
of the prior orders of Judge
Croft and Judge Sawaya."
(R. 154).
Undaunted by Judge Snow's Order, counsel for
Defendant tried yet again to seek the discovery which
had been prohibited by the Court's Protective Order on August 3, 1976 it filed a Notice of Deposition upon
Written Questions of James Wellbeloved of Sheraton Inns,
Inc.

(R.

158).
Since it seemed the matter had been adequately

handled by the Court at that time, Plaintiff did file
another Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions.
181-183) •

As part of the material set forth in that

motion, Plaintiff stated:
"The attempt by defendant to
undertake discovery which has
previously been rejected by
this court constitutes an effort
which is not in good faith,
which violates the letter and
spirit of Rule 11, and which
is tantamount to contempt of
Judge Snow's prior order.
It
is respectfully submitted that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(R.

th~s

behavior is sufficiently
to warrant the imposition of sanctions against defendant in such mode as the
court may deem appropriate."
(Tr. 183).

g~ievous

The Motion for Protective Order was granted and
the Court imposed sanctions in the sum of $100 attorney's
fees against Defendant "based upon Defendant's attempt to
circumvent the protective order of this court as heretofore
made and entered on the 14th day of July, 1976".

(R. 189-

190).
Lest it be assumed that Defendant's persistence
in this matter became weakened by the several summary
judgments, the two protective orders, and the imposition
of sanctions for deliberate attempts to violate previous
orders, at trial, counsel started promptly again attempting
to interject the Sheraton Inn Franchise issue which had been
buried, indeed cremated, by the preceding orders of Judge
Croft, Judge Hanson, Sr., Judge Sawaya, and Judge Snow.
(R. 244 through 255).

This entire line of questioning,

over repeated objections by Plaintiff's counsel, dealt
with the Sheraton Inn Franchise issue or various facets of
it.

As noted above, the Court ultimately entered its

Findings and conclusions and Judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
Since defense counsel insisted on introducing
evidence, over objection, relative to Mr. Lowe's efforts
on behalf of Development to obtain the Sheraton Franchise,
the Court made a finding with respect to this matter which
the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding
for digitization of
provided
by the Institute
is Sponsored
set byforth
inLawthe
Findings
Fact
No.of Museum
11: and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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"The court finds in this connection

tha~ De~elopment did exercise good

faith in pursuing the Sheraton Inn
Franchise and took the indicated
necessary steps toward receiving
the franc~ise including the payment
of a portion of the franchise fee
the submission of extensive feasi~
bility and market studies and the
sending of other document~tion to
the Sheraton Inn organization."
There is clearly evidence in the record to support this
finding

(R. 243, ~ seg.) which was introduced in evidenc,

over Plaintiff's objection, and which defense counsel de·
sired to place in evidence rather than relying on his hope
for reversal of Judge Croft's Order through the Proffer of
Proof also submitted.
The trial court made numerous findings relative
to the rights of the parties.

Specifically, the Court

found that at the time Development exercised its right to
seek refund of its monies under the contract, it was not
in default of the provisions of the contract.
Finding No. 12).

(Tr. 205 •

It further found that in all respects

"Development duly and properly exercised its rights under
paragraph 26 of the contract, under circumstances in which
i t had the right to do so, and it was therefore entitled
to a refund of all sums theretofore paid by Defendant to
Greater Park City Company" less interest at the Chase
Manhattan rate as previously indicated.

The Court speci·

fically found that the Defendant's "fraud defense" was
. n

groundless.

(See Finding No. 10 at Tr. 204 and Conclusio
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No. 3 at Tr. 206).
Finally, the Court made findings to the effect
that the retention by Defendant of $125,000, as it claims,
would constitute "an unconscionable forfeiture or penalty".
(Tr. 206).
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POINT I
JUDGE CROFT DID NOT ERR IN
ISSUING THE PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Point I of Appellant's Brief is comprised of
an amalgamation. of attacks against the Sununary Judgment
issued by Judge Croft on October 10, 1975.

(R. 79-80).

A substantial number of the arguments raised in Point I

are illustrative of a recurrent theme in this appeal -counsel for Defendant, not having represented Defendant
at the time of Judge Croft's Sununary Judgment, are seekin1
to raise issues for the first time on appeal in hopes
of relitigating, virtually de

~·

issues previously

handled by other counsel who, in their own judgment, eitht
neglected or did not feel it appropriate to raise the
issues now raised.

This effort at "Monday morning quarter

backing" runs clearly contrary to the numerous decisions
of this Court which hold that an issue, to be pressed on
appeal, must have been raised below. F/N

An example of Defendant's de nova approach to
this appeal is the procedural argument found on p. 14 of

F/N see, ~· Meyer v. DeLuke, 23 Utah 2d 74'. 457
P.2d 966 (1969) ("A Pc;>int neither ra~sed in.theilv
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial ordinar ·
cannot be considered for the first time on appe~1·
In the Matter of the Estate of Akker, 19 U~ah 2 b~
414 432 p 2d 45 (1967) ("Neither of the fir7t.,
,
.
1 d.
put in is ..
points were raised in the p ea ings nor .
ed fc:
at trial. Therefore, they cannot be consider
the first time on this appeal.")
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its Brief, i.e., a motion for judgment on the pleadings
is not proper until the pleadings are closed.

At no

time did counsel's predecessor raise this issue before
Judge Croft. F/N
In all events, even if the issue were properly
here, it is a red herring rather than an issue inasmuch as
the motion was not granted as a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings but rather was granted as a Motion for Summary
Judgment.

(See the Minute Entry at R. 78) .

It is clear

that a Motion for Summary Judgment is timely filed and
appropriate "at any time after the expiration of twenty
(20) days from the conunencement of the action".

Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(a).
Defendant goes on, at p. 15 of its Brief, to
create another straw man by taking the position that the
Motion for Summary Judgment (properly a Motion for Summary
Judgment since the contract was, as a matter of evidence,
before the Court) must be treated as a Motion to Dismiss
and proceeding,

thereafter, to point out why a Motion to

Dismiss should not have been granted.
~raised

This argument was

below by counsel's predecessor in interest

and, moreover, it is totally spurious.
F/N It is difficult, of course, to support a negative
by reference to the record. However, the Brief
filed by van Cott, Bagley, on behalf of Defendant
(R. 65-75) is a good indicator of what the real
issues were at the time of the argument on summary
judgment.
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To set the procedural record straight on this
motion, and to demonstrate that Defendant's frequent
allusions to lack of due process are groundless, it
should be noted that the Motion for Summary Judgment in
question was filed under date of June 9, 1975.

(R. 4?).

It was originally noticed up for June 12, 1975 (R. 49)
but continued several times (R. 50, R. 76, R. 77) until
i t was finally heard on October 9, 1975.

(R. 78).

There·

fore counsel for Defendant had four months in which to
raise any issue they wanted to raise, in which to file
affidavits, in which to submit memoranda (which they did
(R. 65-75)) or to raise any questions they desired.

Nm

being dissatisfied with the previous handling of the case
and with the benefit of "20-20 hindsight", counsel seekst:
raise newborn issues, de

~,

on this appeal.

Much the same is true of counsel's extensive
argument regarding the parole evidence rule and integraThis iss~'

tion problems conunencing at p. 16 of its Brief.
simply was not raised below.

Both parties went forward

on the motion full-well knowing that the only evidence
before the Court was the written contract itself.

Defenda:

did not raise the question of integration nor the question
of extrinsic evidence.

Nor did it attempt to place ex-

trinsic evidence in the record, which it could have done
. h .t h d
by affidavit in the four mont h s wh ic 1
a ·

The parties

clearly recognized that the issue presen t e d on

the motion

was one which could be resolved by the contract itself
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and without the need for additional evidence.

A Motion

for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 pu t s a burden on the
opposing party to present evidence of issues he desires
to raise.

Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624

(1960).
There is a strong corollary between the instant
case and Mastic Tile Division of Rubberoid co. v. Acme
Distributing Co., 15 Utah 2d 136, 389 P.2d 56 (1964).
As noted by the Court:
"Both sides laid the matter in
the lap of the court by their
mutual motions, and under the
facts of this particular case
unequivocally invited and
authorized the court to decide
the case by interpreting the
documents. This the court did.
Having done so in a case like
this, where interpretation of
the writings was the only issue,
we do not think the court should
be required to submit to the
subsequent urging of the loser
that although he took his chances
without reservation, he must have
another go at the case, - although
it is conceivable that in some
other and unusual case this might
be so."
Of course the instant case does not involve cross-motions
for summary judgment, but it just as clearly involves

a

situation where the parties knowingly submitted the case
with the only factual matter before the Court being the
document itself.

Having done so, Defendant is now pre-

cluded from seeking to inject extrinsic evidence into the
interpretation or effect of the document.
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After exhausting its procedural bag of tricks,
Defendant finally does get to the merits of Judge Croft's
Order commencing at p. 22 of its Brief.

This is a ques-

tion which was raised properly below and to which we wil1
be happy to respond.
Before embarking upon an analysis of the case
law, however, it is appropriate to analyze some distinctive
elements of the contract in question.

Paragraph 26, quote:

hereinabove, contains the following language (which is
emphasized for purposes of aiding in the following argument
"In the event that such franchise
[a Sheraton Franchise] or a comparable franchise is not obtained
prior to June l, 1974 purchaser
shall have the right, upon written
notice to GPCC given not later than
June 15, 1974, to reconvey the
subject property to GPCC, in which
event GPCC shall be obligated,
promptly following such termination,
to refund to purchaser all sums
theretofore paid by purchaser to
GPCC as purchase price for the subject property pursuant to para~raph
2 hereof, less a sum equal to interest on said purchase price from
the date hereof to the date of such
termination at the prime commercial
rate established by Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., from time to time durin~
such period."
(R. 32-33).
(Emphasis
added).
Certain things are fai. rly self-evi· dent from this
language.

First, there is nothing in the language itself

which creates any Obli. gation on the part of the purchaser
to obtain the Sheraton Franchise.

Paraqraph 26, should,
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in this respect, be read in contradistinction to other
provisions in the contract wherein various third party
actions are made conditions of the contractual commitments.
See for example paragraph 8 (commencing at R. 23) dealing
with building permits.

That provision also provides for

a reconveyance in the event that the building permits are
not obtained, but note the language which clearly makes it
obligatory upon purchaser to do certain things in this
connection:
"GPCC agrees that, in the event
the prior to June 1, 1974 purchaser
shall make all necessary applications
and take all action necessary to
obtain a building permit • • • and
shall diligently pursue efforts~
obtain such permits, and, in the event
that any of such permits are not obtained prior to June 1, 1974, purchaser
shall have a right upon written notice
to GPCC given not later than June 15,
1974, to reconvey the subject property.
(Emphasis added).

n

Also interestingly enough, in the event that the building
permits are not obtained following the diligent pursuit
thereof by purchaser, it should be noted that GPCC is obligated to refund all of the purchase price rather than all
of the purchase price less interest at the Chase Manhattan
rate, as is the case under paragraph 26.
This comparison between paragraphs 26 and 8 leaves
one to the obvious conclusion that, had the parties desired
to include some affirmative obligation on the part of the
purchaser to use diligence in obtaining a Sheraton Franchise they certainly knew the language with which to
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accomplish this result - they could merely have used the
same type of language - ~.,due diligence, etc._ as
used in paragraph 8.

Th a t th ey d'd
i
not d o so lends very

substantial credence to the interpretation of the contract
urged by the Plaintiff.
A second factor which needs to be emphasized in
comparing the instant case with many of those cited by
Defendant is the fact that the failure to obtain the
Sheraton Franchise does not result in the contract becornir.:
a mere nullity or a "bare option".

Rather, unlike paragra:

8 for example, paragraph 26 specifically provides that if
the Sheraton Franchise is not obtained, and if reconveyance
is sought by the purchaser, the purchaser is required to
pay interest on the full purchase price for the period frc:
the date of the contract to the date of termination.

Note

that the full purchase price in this case is $630, 000.00.
Interest on it from the date of contract to the date of
termination is not some mere trifling deposit but rather
the sum of $21,024.99.

(See Tr. 84-85).

So we do not have

a situation where by reconveyance the purchaser converts thi
contract to a mere nullity or an illusory contract.

Rathe:

in the instant case we have a unique situation where the
purchaser in effect has two ways in which he may perform t:
contract:

(a) he may obtain a Sheraton Franchise and proc:

with the matter, or (b) if the Sheraton Franchise is n~
obtained he may pay interest on the entire purchase price
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for several months and rel'ieve h'imself of further obligations.
Bearing these critical distinctions in mind, we
turn now to an analysis of the cases cited by Defendant.
Defendant relies heavily upon the case of Stabile v. McCarthy,
336 Mass. Repts. 339, 145 N.E.2d 821 (1957).
pellant's Brief at Tr. 23, et seq.).

(See Ap-

A close look at

Stabile demonstrates immediately that it is fundamentally
distinguishable from the instant case.

For example, the

contract language in Stabile provided:
"This agreement is subject to the
right of the buyer in the event
that he shall have been unable
to obtain the approval of the
Wilmington Planning Board of the
proposed subdivision date of the
• • • premises prior to the date
. • . set for performance • . •
at his option to cancel this
agreement and claim the return
of his deposit, in which event
this agreement shall terminate
without further obligation on the
part of either party • . •. " (Emphasis added).
Immediately two distinctions are evident.
tract speaks in obligatory language.

First, the con-

In fact, the Court

in quoting from the contract and discussing the obligation
by the purchaser to obtain the permit itself stressed the
word "unable" in its analysis.

(See 145 N.E.2d 821 at 823).

A second critical distinction, is that in Stabile, unlike
the instant case, the failure to obtain the building permit
constituted a complete washout of the contract with the
total deposit being returned to the purchaser - this is
highly distinguishable from the situation as present wherein
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the purchaser is able to retain interest on the entire
purchase price for the period in question.

r n one case,

Stabile, the contract becomes a nullity, whereas in the
instant case the contract merely is performed in an alternative manner.

Finally, a point which in all candor

should have been brought out by the Defendant itself in
citing this case is that there was really no dispute in
the case about the Plaintiff having an affirmative obligation to obtain the Planning Board approval.

The Court

itself observes this as follows:
"The plaintiff in his brief in
effect concedes that he was
bound to use reasonable efforts
to obtain Planning Board approval."
(145 N.E.2d 821 at 823).
This being the case, the only issue before the Court in
Stabile is whether, in fact, he had used such reasonable
efforts.
The case of Lyon v. Giannoni, 16 8 Cal. App. 2d
336, 335 P.2d 690 (1959) discussed at pp. 26 and 27 of
Appellant's Brief is likewise quite distinguishable.

In

that case like Stabile, but unlike the instant case, the
interpretation of the contract would have required that
the total deposit be returned in the event the condition
precedent was not satisfied.

The Court merely held that

the right to have the water tested by a reliable pump
company, given to the purchaser by the contract, did not
make the contract a mere option or a nullity.

We com-

pletely agree with that interpretation and do not urge
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otherwise in the instant case.

We are not claiming that

the contract should be a mere option or a nullity - those
are words chosen by the Defendant in an attempt to improperly characterize the case.

Our contention merely is

that the purchaser in the instant contract had available
alternative means of performing the contract, either of
which requires valuable consideration to flow to the seller.
He may pursue either of those courses without being in
default of the contract.
Nor is this a case where the purchaser is seeking
to avoid liability by refusing to perform a condition
precedent (as argued at pp. 28 and 29 of Appellant's Brief).
Appellant has conveniently ignored the entire concept of
alternative performance even though that was stressed and
argued extensively before Judge Croft at the time the
motion was originally heard.
Some fundamental distinctions, critical to the
type of contract here in question, have apparently alluded
the Defendant.

It is perfectly permissible for a contract

to call for alternative performance - i.e., the promiser
may fulfill the contract by fulfilling either of two
alternatives.

This was early recognized by this Court in

Bradbury v. Fillingame, 84 Utah 178, 35 P.2d 772 (1934).
See also Restatement of Contracts, §325; Corbin on Contracts,
§1079 (1964).

In the instant case, under paragraph 26 as
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it is written, the purchaser may fulfill the contract
in one of two ways - he may obtain the Sheraton Franchise
and proceed with the contract or he may, alternatively,
not obtain the Sheraton Franchise, reconvey the property,
and pay interest on the total purchase price for the perioo
from the date of the contract to the period of terminati' on.
The question, of course, arises as to whether
the contract is truly one for alternative performance or
rather is one which has performance on the one hand and
a provision for liquidated damages on the other - such a
contract would not be one for alternative performance since
failure to perform the main obligation is a default or
breach of the contract which then triggers the liquidated
damages provision.

Each contract, of course, must be

analyzed under its own tenns to determine which of these
two types of contracts really exist.

In the instant case,

the answer seems rather evident - that is it seems clear
that the parties did not consider that the failure to ob·
tain a Sheraton Franchise and the corollary payment of
interest on the total purchase price was to be a default
of the contract.

This is quite clear from an analysis and

comparison between paragraphs 25 and 26 of the contract (R.
30, et seq.).

Paragraph 25 deals, in orthodox terms, with

occasions of default.

Note, for example, that under para·

graph 25(a) after giving notice of default and the like
and after failure to cure the default within thirty ( 30)
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days the seller has a variety of options available including
the right under paragraph 25{a) of retaining all funds paid
as liquidated damages.

Note that this paragraph is intended

to cover all defaults.

However, it obviously does not

apply to the failure to obtain a Sheraton Franchise since
that is dealt with expressly in paragraph 26 in another
manner.

Under paragraph 26 if the Sheraton Franchise is

not obtained, purchaser is given the "right" to terminate
and the vendor has the "obligation" to refund purchaser all
sums theretofore paid less Chase Manhattan interest on the
entire purchase price.

If it was considered by the parties

that the failure to obtain a Sheraton Franchise was in fact
a default under the contract, rather than merely an alternative performance under the contract, there would be no
reason for this language since the default provisions of
paragraph 25 could have applied.

Rather than allowing those

provisions to apply, the parties dealt specifically with
this issue and provided a method for handling the situation
in which the

She~aton

Franchise was not obtained.

Further

support for this analysis may be found in the absence of
any language which refers to the Chase Manhattan interest as
being liquidated damages or the like.

Rather, it is in

effect rental for the property during the period in question,
which is uniquely intended to compensate the vendor for any
inconvenience he may have suffered.
Corbin, in his work on contracts, has recognized
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the fundamental distinction which we seek t o make here.
In Section 1082 of his work he notes:
"It is evident that some alternative
contracts giving the power of choice
between the alternatives to the
promiser can easily be confused with
contracts that provide for the payment of liquidated damages in the
case of breach, provided that one of
the alternatives is the payment of
a sum of money. Certain important
differences between these two kinds
of contracts, however, have been
indicated above. There is no chance
of such confusion in the case of an
alternative contract where neither
alternative performance is the payment
of a sum of money.
If, upon a proper
interpretation of the contract, it is
found that the parties have agreed
that either one of the two alternative
performances is to be given by the
promiser and received by the promisee
as the agreed exchange and equivalent
for the return performance rendered
by the promisee, the contract is a
true alternative contract. This is
true even though one of the alternative performances is the payment of a
liquidated sum of money; that fact does
not make the contract one for rendering
of a single performance with the provision for liquidated damages in case of
breach. n
Corbin quotes extensively from the case of Pearson v.
Williams, 24 Wend.

(N.Y.) 244 (1840).

We quote Corbin's

footnote as follows:
"In Pearson v. Williams, 24 Wend.
(N.Y.) 244 (1840), the plaintiff
conveyed land to the defendant,
receiving in part payment $21,0?0
in cash, the defendant covenanting
further that he would erect two
brick houses on the land by a certain date or, in default of erecting
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the houses by that date, he would pay
to the plaintiff the sum of $4,000 or
more. The defendant failed to erect
the houses, and the plaintiff recovered
judgment for $4,000. The court said·
'This does not belong to the class of
cases in which the question of liquidated
damages has usually arisen . • • Here
there is no absolute engagement to build
the houses. It was optional with the
defendant whether he would build them or
not; and there would have been no sufficient breach if the plaintiffs had
stopped with alleging that the houses were
not built. This is not a covenant to
build, with a liquidation of the damages
in case of nonperformance; but it is a
covenant to build within a specified time
or afterwards to pay a sum of money. The
money is not to be paid by way of damages
for not building the houses; but it is
to be paid if the houses are not built
as part of the contract price for the
lots conveyed by the intestate. Again,
this is not simply an alternative covenant
to build or to pay a sum of money within a
specified period. If it were so, the
question of damages would perhaps be open;
but it is an agreement to build by a certain
day or afterwards pay a sum of money. When
the day for building had gone by, it was
then merely a covenant to pay money. It
was necessary in declaring, to allege that
the houses were not built--not, however, because that part of the contract was any
longer in force--but by way of showing that
the event had happened upon which the defendant agreed to pay the money. It had
now become a simple covenant to pay money;
and like other cases where there is an
agreement to pay a gross sum of money; that
sum I with interest from the time it became
H
payable, forms the measure of damages.
In conclusion, the contract which is the subject
of the instant action was one which obviously was negotiated between the parties in some detail.

To sustain the
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Defendant's contention with respect to that contract
requires the Court to rewrite it in a way no t originally
·
done by the parties themselves and to add terms which
they did not themselves feel appropriate to paragraph 2 .
6

(Even though, as noted above, they knew how to accomplis:
that result had they so desired - see for example paragrai
8 of the contract) •

This Court has frequently held that

it is its duty to enforce contracts as written not as
rewritten judicially.

In Ephriam Theatre v. Hawk, 7 Utah

2d 163, 166, 321 P.2d 221 (1958) this Court noted:
"In considering the controversy
here it is well to keep in mind
the fundamental concepts in regard
to contracts: that their purpose
is to reduce to writing the conditions upon which the minds of the
parties-have met and to fix their
rights and duties in respect thereto.
The intent so expressed is to be
found, if possible, within the four
corners of the instrument itself in
accordance with the ordinarv accepted
meaninq of the words used.
Unless
there is ambiquitv or uncertainty
in the lanquaqe so that the meaninq
is confused, or is susceptible of
more than one meaninq, there is no
justification for interpretation
or explanation from extraneous sources.
• • • Generally speaking, neither ~f
the parties nor the cour~ ~as any.right
to ignore or modify conditions which
are clearly expressed merely because
it may subject one of the parties to
hardship .
"
see also numerous other decisions to the same general
effect.

Holley v. Federal-American Partners, 29 Utah 2d

212, 507 P.2d 381 (1973); Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28
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utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972); Skousen v. Smith, 27
Utah 2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972).
In a very recent decision, Woodland Theatres, Inc.
v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc., 560 P.2d 700 (Utah, 1977),
this Court has dealt expressly with a similar problem wherein
one of the parties sought to impose implied conditions in a
lease contract.

This Court quoted with approval from Percoff

v. Solomon, 259 Ala. 482, 67 So. 2d 21 (1953) as follows:

"An implied covenant must rest
entirely on the presumed intention
of the parties as gathered from
the terms as actually expressed
in the written instrument itself,
and it must appear that it was so
clearly within the contemplation
of the parties that they deemed it
unnecessary to express it, and
therefore omitted to do so; or it
must appear that it is necessary
to infer such a covenant in order
to effectuate the full purpose of
the contract as a whole as gathered
from the written instrument. It
is not enough to say that an implied
covenant is necessary in order to
make the contract fair, or that
without such a covenant it would
be improvident or unwise, or that
the contract would operate unjustly.
It must arise from the presumed intention of the parties as gathered
from the instrument as a whole."
The interpretation urged by Defendant is improper
and the partial summary judgment granted by Judge Croft should
be sustained.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING REGARDING
THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF DEFENDANT'S
CLAIMED FORFEITURE WAS PROPER AND IS
DISPOSITIVE.
In Point II of its Brief, Appellant complains of
the trial court's ruling regarding the unconscionability
of the forfeiture here sought to be retained by Defendant.
Naturally, it only becomes necessary to involve
oneself in this analysis if one finds that the Plaintiff
has breached the contract - a finding not made by the
trial court below and not, we submit, otherwise appropriate.
Assuming arguendo such a breach is found or assuming this
Court determines there was error in the construction of
the contract relative to the breach or non-breach thereof,
we nonetheless submit that Judge Hanson's finding regarding the unconscionable penalty is dispositive of this
case and was entirely appropriate.
Defendant's first complaint is that the finding
was unnecessary and therefore should simply be disregarded.
We completely disagree.

It is entirely appropriate for ~y

Court in issuing its decision to give alternative reasons
justifying its decision.

This is commonly practiced in both

trial and appellate cour t s and Cannot be condemned - indeed,
to do so would result in a massively awkward method of
· d'icia
· 1 d'ispu t es. F/N
handling JU

F/N see, ~·, Santi. v. Denver & R. G. West Re 1 · co.,. 21 Ut~
fie'
0
2d 157 442 p. 2d 921 (1968) (after finding no v~lid
·
and ac~eptance, this court went on further to di~cu~r 11
the Statute of Frauds). See also Engstrc;>m v .. Bus n~~ade
Utah 2d 250, 436 P.2d 806 (1968), wherein this Co~r~onsti
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Defendant further makes broad assertions that
there are no facts in the record from which this determination could have been made, and yet the facts are present,
glaring, and totally persuasive.

The known facts, which are

comparable to the facts which have been available to this
court in numerous decisions regarding forfeitures, are as
follows:
(1)

The contractually specified purchase price

was $630,000.00.
(2)

The contract was entered into under date of

February 7, 1974 and was terminated on June 13, 1974 - an
elaosed time of somethina over four months.
(3)

Interest on the ourchase orice for four

months at Chase's rate of interest is the sum of $21,024.99.
(See Tr. 84-85).
(4)

The amount of the forefeiture beina claimed

bv Defendant to be aoorooriate is the sum of $125,000.00.
which is the total of the sums oaid orecedina. at the time
of, and subseauent to the actual execution of the contract.
In addition. Defendant had the use of this money interest-free
for three to four months.
(5)

Plaintiff was never given possession of the

(6)

Plaintiff was never given a deed to the pro-

(7)

Plaintiff in no way entered upon the propery

property.

perty.

or depreciated it in any sense.
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So what we have in this case is a situation
·
whe:
the total inconvenience to the Defendant has been the
fact that for a period of about four months its property wa;
"tied up" by a potential purchaser who neither occupied nor
built upon the ground.

The actual amount being paid by

Plaintiff exceeds the Chase interest of $21,000.00 -

it~~

includes interest on the funds paid during the period that
they were retained by Defendant, interest-free.
The damages sought of $125,000.00 are grossly
disproportionate to any conceivable harm that could have
befallen or could have been predicted to befall the Defendant
during the very short period from February 7th to June 1st
of 1974.
Even if Plaintiff had possessed the property to
the exclusion of Defendant during the period in question,
the most logical determination of actual damages to the
Defendant would be rental value which is, at least roughly,
equivalent to the very interest which it has received.

The

Court below needed no further facts to make the finding and,
indeed, this Court by reviewing the same facts can just as
clearly recognize that to allow Defendant to retain
$125,000.00 for,

in effect, having its property "tied up"

for a four month period as against a total purchase price
of $630,000.00 is unconscionable.

$125,000.00 is fully 20%

of the total purchase price of $ 630 , 00 0 . 00 ·

If

O ne

annuaHze:

the return that Defendant would thereby receive, it will be
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noted that at this rate of return Defendant receives a
79% annual return on his purchase price - clearly a figure
which shocks the conscience.
The Supreme Court of Utah was among the first in
this country to recognize the harshness of forfeiture provisions such as those contained in paragraph 25 of the instant
F/N
contract.
Probably because of the common use of the Uniform
Real Estate Contract in Utah, there are literally dozens of
decisions of this Court dealing with the subject.

In more

modern times, perhaps Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243
P.2d 446 (1952) is the controlling precedent.

The pertinent

facts in Perkins v. Spencer are not far off from those presented in the instant case - the purchase price involved was
$10,500.00 of which the purchaser had paid a total of
$2,725.00 when he defaulted.

This Court concluded that this

was an unenforceable penalty and sent the matter back down
for determination of actual damages.

The relative relationships

of the figures and the time in question are comparable to the
instant case, although in the instant case there was not in
fact occupancy of the premises - a quite significant distinction.
Another case with some factual similarities is Engstrom v.
Bushnell, 20 Utah 2d 250, 436 P.2d 806 (1968), wherein the

F/N For an excellent historical discussion with partic~lar .
emphasis on the Utah contribution to the case law in this
area, arising from the seminal decision of M~lmberi v.
Baugh 62 Utah 331 218 Pac. 975 (1923) see Forfeitures
Under' Real Estate Installment Contracts in Utah", Vol.
Utah
Law Review 30 (19 ).
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Court noted that the retention of $16,000.00 against a total
purchase price of $58, 000. 00 would in effect be an unconscionable penalty.
It is difficult to determine some exac t scientif:
ratio by which the Courts determine whether a particular s~
in a particular case constitutes a valid provision for liquidated damages or an unconscionable penalty.

The cases are

replete with references to "equity" and "the conscience of
the court".

We conclude from this that the decision is

essentially an equitable one in which the Court should consider the various relevant circumstances and come to what ma:
well be a visceral and yet equitable reaction on an ad hoc
basis.

Certainly, any attempt to set down a precise formula

would run afoul of the next more complicated factual situatk
In the present case, however, we respectfully submit that the
facts are so extremely clear and the damages so completely
unconscionable that reasonable minds could not seriously dif
on the result and that, in all events, normal deference shou::
be given to the trial court's holding.

Indeed, the instant

case is substantially more appealing than many of those in
which this Court has found forfeitures.

The conduct of

Development Services cannot be castigated as being wanton or
malicious in any respect - indeed they spent very substantial
funds in an attempt to comply with the provisions of the con·
tracts, including not only the funds paid directly to Greater
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Park City Company but also those funds expended for feasibility studies, etc.

At no time did they take possession

of the property or depreciate it in any sense.

The time

period was extremely short - slightly over four months.
Under Plaintiff's interpretation of this case,
the provisions of paragraph 26 which call for Chase brass
interest on the total purchase price ($21,000.00) is certainly a sufficient and reasonable award to Defendant for
any damages it could conceivably suffer.

For Defendant to

now demand complete forfeiture of the entire $125,000.00,
in fact, supports Plaintiff's contentions made in Point I
of this Brief that there has in fact been no default.
This is so because Defendant is urging an interpretation of
the contract which is wholly inequitable.

This Court has

previously noted that "it is further pertinent to observe
here that where there is a choice, an interpretation which
will bring about an equitable result will be preferred over
a harsh or inequitable one." .F/N

F/N Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d
1007 (1972).
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POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN A.Jl.1PLE OPPORTUNITIES
TO PRESENT ITS CASE AND WAS ACCORDED
COMPLETE DUE PROCESS
Point III of Appellant's Brief seeks again to
criticize the lower courts for failing to accord Defendant
a full opportunity to present facts.

We have already dealt

with this issue extensively in the factual portion of this
Brief (see particularly pp. 6 through 12, supra), and
therefore we shall not respond at great length again.
Counsel currently representing Defendant perhaps
do not have the same total perspective of this case as
Plaintiff's counsel do, inasmuch as Defendant's current
counsel were brought in anew after the critical decision of
Judge Croft.

Looking at the case as a whole, however, and

not merely at the portion of the case in which current counse.
has been involved, it is quite apparent that the Defendant
has been given its full day in court not once but indeed
several times.

The Motion for Summary Judgment originally

filed specifically dealt with the Sheraton Franchise issue.
(See R. 4 7-48).

Counsel for Defendant had fully four months

in which to take depositions, file affidavits, or submit any
evidence desired to be considered by the Court in making its
decision.

That evidence, indeed, could have included the

types of things proffered as evidence by Defendant's new
·
d·
counsel at the trial of t h is procee ing.

Defendant did not

present such affidavits nor did it seek to continue the motior
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claiminq that affidavits were unavailable as they could have
done under Rule 56{f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rather

they knowingly and willingly participated in arguments on
the Motion for Summary Judqment when the only matter in the
file evidentiarilv was the contract itself.

They should not

be allowed the opportunity, now, of relitigating issues that
should properly have been submitted at that juncture.
Much the same thing is true of the subsequent
summary judgment entered by Judge Sawaya.

It too was con-

tinued for several weeks before finally being heard, and
among the stated reasons for those continuances was to allow
Defendant to obtain affidavits, which they did not do.
It seems to us that Defendant has been given
every opportunity to properly present its case but has
to do so.

failed

Indeed they were given a unique opportunity, fol-

lowinq the initial decision of Judge Croft, to amend their
Answer and raise additional defenses.
Perhaps the most astounding development in this
whole sequence of events was at the trial itself.

Defendant,

having been told repeatedly that the Sheraton Franchise issue
was totally resolved, proceeded to interject evidence at the
trial regarding that issue, rather than relying exclusively
on their Proffer of Proof.

On behalf of Plaintiff, objections

were made not once but several times to the effect that such
evidence was precluded by the prior summary judgments.
theless the trial court allowed the evidence in.
through 255).

None-

(R. 244

How then, having forced this material into the
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record over objections of Plaintiff's counsel,

can Defendant

logically complain when the trial courts make a finding on
the subject.
Finally, even the Proffer of Proof itself is un.
availing and somewhat diseased from an evidentiary point of
view.

With respect to the testimony proffered from Messrs.

Zeldman and Wellbeloved (coitUUencing at p. 2 of the Proffer),
many of the materials are speculative and would be inadmissit
as a matter of evidence.

See for example, paragraph 6 at p.

4 of the Proffer wherein it is stated:

"Mr. Wellbeloved cannot recall
specifically requesting Mr. Lowe
to submit such proof, but assumes
that Mr. Lowe knew that such proof
was required."
Quite obviously, such testimony would not be admissible. Nor
does the Proffer contain any evidence with respect to Sherato:
attitude about issuing a franchise to a company which did not
have the financial ability to buy the property in question.
One could quite logically assume that if Sheraton does indeed
require evidence of control of the property, as indicated in
the Proffer (paragraph 3), that they would not issue a franchise to a company which had not a deed or contract to purcha:
the property and the financial ability to do so - a condition
precedent which Development Services did not meet.
The remainder of the Proffer purports to introduce
parole evidence which, if introduced at all, should have been
introduced at the time of Judge Croft's summary judgment, not
almost a year later.
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CONCLUSION
When all is said and done, the case boils down
to a relatively simple contract case.

The contract expressly

provides that if a Sheraton Franchise is not obtained on or
before June 1, 1974, that the purchaser has "the right" to
a refund of all sums paid less interest on the total purchase
price for the period in question.

A Sheraton Franchise was

not obtained on the due date, a fact not disputed, and Plaintiff properly seeks recovery of its funds paid less interest
amounting to some $21,000.00.

The case, in one form or another,

has received the scrutiny of several District Court Judges
all of whom have consistently held that Plaintiff did not
violate the contract, that it was not in default of the contract, and that it properly sought to enforce its express
rights under the contract.
The trial court should be affirmed.
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